Sept. 13, 2017 "Inside the demise of Juicero": Today I found this article by Olivia Zaleski, Ellen Huet, and Brad Stone in the Globe and Mail. It was in the life section, but it is a job article because it's about a business.
Half a dozen former employees, executives and investors tell the story of how a juice press company went from startup to fire sale
On Sept. 1, as many U.S. businesses closed early for the Labour Day holiday weekend, Juicero Inc. – a lavishly funded startup that once sold a $699 (U.S.) WiFi-connected juice press – announced it was shutting down forever.
Juicero’s demise was not unexpected. Its collapse was the consequence of unsustainable costs, unflattering headlines and a bungled launch. After netting about $134-million in funding from such investors as Google Ventures and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, Juicero was losing about $4-million a month.
Four years after its founding, the startup was unable to find new backers willing to fund its ambition of making fresh juice accessible to all.
Four years after its founding, the startup was unable to find new backers willing to fund its ambition of making fresh juice accessible to all.
It wasn’t for a lack of trying. Over the summer, the board had discussed a generous injection of capital from existing investors. But it was too late, according to about a half-dozen insiders including executives, investors and former employees. Weeks later, the board determined the company’s operations, which required shipping refrigerated pouches of fresh fruits and vegetables, were too expensive for the startup.
Juicero said it was seeking a buyer and would reimburse consumers for the price of the device. “As we enter this new chapter, we also want to express the deepest gratitude to our employees who have poured their hearts and souls into developing, launching and growing Juicero over the past 3 years,” the company said in a statement.
Juicero said it was seeking a buyer and would reimburse consumers for the price of the device. “As we enter this new chapter, we also want to express the deepest gratitude to our employees who have poured their hearts and souls into developing, launching and growing Juicero over the past 3 years,” the company said in a statement.
Months before the end, a few of Juicero’s investors had lost faith in the press, touted by founder Doug Evans as a powerful machine capable of squeezing bagged chunks of fruits and vegetables into fresh juice.
In April, Bloomberg reported that at least two of Juicero’s backers were surprised to discover that the startup’s proprietary bags didn’t require Evans’s press, but could yield almost a full glass of juice when squeezed by hand.
In April, Bloomberg reported that at least two of Juicero’s backers were surprised to discover that the startup’s proprietary bags didn’t require Evans’s press, but could yield almost a full glass of juice when squeezed by hand.
The news hit the company hard. A funding negotiation worth about $55-million fell apart, say the insiders, who asked not to be identified because many of them signed confidentiality agreements. And for a few days, the Web lit up with scornful Juicero commentary.
A chastened board offered to refund customers unhappy with the press. The company says fewer than 5 per cent of owners returned their machines during a 30-day window.
A chastened board offered to refund customers unhappy with the press. The company says fewer than 5 per cent of owners returned their machines during a 30-day window.
The directors, including Evans, declined to comment or didn’t respond to requests.
Evans, who is now 51, got into the juice business back in 2002, when he co-founded Organic Avenue, a New York-based chain of juice bars selling cold-press concoctions in glass jars.
After working on the business for a decade, he sold a controlling stake to an investor, who pushed him out. Organic Avenue would soon go under, but Evans was already at work on his next project, Juicero, which he started in 2013. He debuted the press in 2016 after spending about three years building a dozen prototypes.
After working on the business for a decade, he sold a controlling stake to an investor, who pushed him out. Organic Avenue would soon go under, but Evans was already at work on his next project, Juicero, which he started in 2013. He debuted the press in 2016 after spending about three years building a dozen prototypes.
Several investors praised Evans for being a brilliant entrepreneur and said he was devoted to the company’s vision to bring fresh juice to the home kitchen. But he was a scattered and frenetic chief executive, one of them says. One day, Evans pushed staff to focus on North American expansion; the next he’d say the only thing that mattered was getting celebrities to post about Juicero on their social media accounts.
Some employees say Evans’s passion for wellness was overwhelming. The founder mostly ate raw and vegan foods and would sometimes scold nonvegan employees who ate yogurt or drank milk at team meetings, according to three former employees. He occasionally referred to dairy products as “cow pus,” they say.
In 2016, the first iteration of the Juicero was ready to go to market and Evans embarked on a national media tour to promote it. While speaking to reporters, Evans heralded his juice press as an innovative triumph. The media campaign, two investors and one employee say, turned Juicero into a symbol of founder braggadocio and Silicon Valley excess.
Despite the press’s lofty price, Juicero was losing money, two people familiar with the startup’s financials say. Initially, before operational expenses such as rent and employee salaries, each press cost Juicero $750 to manufacture, one of the people says. After months of limited sales last year, Juicero’s board decided to drop the price to $399.
By October, the board had replaced Evans with a more polished operator, Jeff Dunn, a former Coca-Cola Co. president. The idea was that Dunn would manage daily operations, while Evans would keep his board seat and focus on fundraising and recruiting in collaboration with Dunn.
Two former employees say Dunn was capable and practical. Under Dunn, a former executive says, sales picked up and Juicero began working on a cheaper press, called V2, which the company planned to release in 2018. The company considered using a bladder rather than a more expensive gearbox to sell the new version of the machine for $199, an investor says.
As Dunn worked to cut costs, Evans focused on what he does best: selling. He persuaded Ticketmaster’s parent company, Live Nation Entertainment Inc., to put Juicero presses in its offices and Whole Foods to stock the products in 11 of its Los Angeles stores.
Evans also set about finding new venture investors. By March of this year, Evans had secured about $45-million in a financing round led by Artis Ventures. Double Bottom Line and Campbell Soup Co. also invested. A group of Asian financiers was also clamouring for a piece of the remaining $55-million in stock at the valuation Juicero wanted, three people familiar with the financing say.
By early April, when UBS was four months through its due diligence process, word spread that Juicero’s pouches could be squeezed by hand. The would-be investors fled, two insiders say. UBS China told the company it wanted to “revisit” the investment in a few months and never finalized a deal, according to one of the people. By May, most of Juicero’s sources of capital had drifted away.
The loss of financing was a devastating blow to Evans, Dunn and Juicero’s board, which included Randy Komisar, a partner at Kleiner Perkins, and David Krane, a founding partner of Google’s venture fund, GV. In June, two sources say, tensions boiled over at a board meeting when Dunn criticized Evans for meddling in company operations and being a disruptive influence on staff. By the end of the meeting, Evans had offered to remove himself entirely from the company, though he would retain his board vote.
Money kept dwindling through mid-July, and Dunn announced plans to axe 25 per cent of his 232 person staff. The job cuts did little to stanch the losses, and Dunn asked the board for an emergency influx of capital to carry the company until it could sell its cheaper press, three people familiar with the events say.
In August, the venture funds with directors on the board – Artis Ventures, GV and Kleiner Perkins – considered buying up to $60-million worth of Juicero shares at a 30-per-cent discount to the last valuation, one of the people says.
In August, the venture funds with directors on the board – Artis Ventures, GV and Kleiner Perkins – considered buying up to $60-million worth of Juicero shares at a 30-per-cent discount to the last valuation, one of the people says.
The proposal came with conditions. Juicero would need to cut its monthly losses to $1-million, three of the people say.
Hungry for the capital, Juicero’s executives and engineers set to work modelling different formulas to cut the company’s burn rate. They concluded a $1-million cap would render the company paralyzed, two of the people say. Worse, Juicero wouldn’t be able to produce its Hail Mary product, the Juicero V2.
With few other options available, Juicero’s board convened on Aug. 23 and voted to wind down the company’s operations. On Aug. 31, at Juicero’s final board meeting, they decided to seek a buyer. The company shared the plan publicly the next day and said it would give customers their money back.
The board members felt obligated to offer refunds, two of the people say; the machines became useless once the company stopped shipping its proprietary juice packs. Investors say they believe the startup’s intellectual property and logistics systems are valuable and will recoup some of their investment; one says the company has been approached multiple times since putting itself up for sale. Several investors also say they felt Juicero was a victim of an anti-elitist political and media climate.
The board members felt obligated to offer refunds, two of the people say; the machines became useless once the company stopped shipping its proprietary juice packs. Investors say they believe the startup’s intellectual property and logistics systems are valuable and will recoup some of their investment; one says the company has been approached multiple times since putting itself up for sale. Several investors also say they felt Juicero was a victim of an anti-elitist political and media climate.
One vote was missing from that final board meeting: Evans’s. The founder had quietly resigned from the board the week before. As Dunn prepared the statement and communicated with Juicero’s board and executives about how to break the news to staff and the public, Evans was as far away as some directors had long wanted. He was in the Nevada desert enjoying Burning Man, an art festival known for all-night parties and self-expression.
Two insiders say Evans had no idea whether the remaining board members would decide to sell the company or go bankrupt. He only learned of the outcome while in the desert, after it was finalized. A few days later, Evans posted a picture on Instagram of the wide and empty desert flats creased with bicycle tracks. The caption: “Peace at Burning Man. #vegan #raw #juice.”
Oct. 27, 2019: I found this article that said Juicero is closing down after 16 months.
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/01/juicero-silicon-valley-shutting-down
My opinion: What makes this product an improvement from a regular blender?
Jan. 23, 2019 "Bombay and Bowring stores to close as company drowns in debt": I found this article by Lauren O'Niel:
Bye bye, Bowring Brothers and the Bombay Company. Bankruptcy is a bitch.
Two of what were once ubiquitous home decor chains in Canada are reportedly moving into liquidation mode after their Brampton-based parent company filed for creditor protection.
Fluid Brands Inc., owned by GTA retail mogul Fred Benitah, is more than $50 million in debt, according to legal filings.
Hundreds of local businesses—printers, photographers, office suppliers, shipping, cleaning, delivery and packaging companies—appear on a list of creditors for the company, many of them owed 10s, if not hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Benitah purchased the Newfoundland-born Bowring as an insolvent company in 2005. Prior to this, it had been operating since 1811 with hundreds of gift shops in Canada at its peak.
The Canadian arm of Bombay and Company, founded in New Orleans circa 1978, had some 55 furniture stores across the country as of 2014.
Both chains filed for bankruptcy protection that year, but an Ontario judge allowed Fluid Brands to work on a new business plan (under court supervision) in the hopes that its owners could reverse their losses.
As it stands now, websites for both brands have been scrubbed and their social media handles deleted.
CTV News reports that closures are expected — an assertion that seems to be supported by the number of Bombay and Bowring warehouse sales right now.
https://www.blogto.com/fashion_style/2018/11/bombay-and-bowring-stores-close-company-goes-bankrupt/
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